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When state and local governments sue prescription opioid manufacturers in
state courts, the defendants often move for courts to stay or dismiss proceedings under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This common-law doctrine instructs courts
to issue stays when waiting for a federal agency to address specific issues within the
case would promote uniformity or allow the court to benefit from the agency’s expertise. In the prescription opioid cases, defendant manufacturers have argued that
courts should stay proceedings until the completion of a new set of studies ordered
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). State courts have divided on whether
to issue stays under the primary jurisdiction doctrine in these cases. A case in
California was under such a stay for four years.
This Comment examines the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine
in misleading advertising suits against prescription opioid manufacturers. The core
principles of uniformity and expertise do not support issuing stays in these cases.
Further, the particular scenario faced by state courts in these cases—requests for
stays for the purpose of the production, rather than simply review, of new evidence—
is not adequately addressed by concerns for uniformity or expertise. This Comment
reframes these requests for stays as requests for courts to defer to the FDA on questions of evidentiary sufficiency. Because the FDA applies a higher standard of sufficiency to scientific questions than the tort system requires of plaintiffs, granting such
deference has the effect of raising plaintiffs’ burden of proof. When deciding whether
to grant stays under the primary jurisdiction doctrine for the purpose of waiting for
the production of new scientific evidence, courts should consider only whether plaintiffs have otherwise met the burden of proof required of them at the given stage of
the trial.
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INTRODUCTION
From 2000 to 2017, more than three hundred thousand people died of overdoses involving opioids in the United States.1 A
2017 report found that more than half of people addicted to illicit
opioids like heroin first became addicted to prescription opioid
painkillers.2 Another report based on 2017 data found that, for
the first time in history, Americans were more likely to die from
an opioid overdose than a car accident.3 This crisis has precipitated a wave of litigation against prescription opioid manufacturers, beginning in the early 2000s with numerous individual and
class action personal injury claims.4 The last decade has seen litigation shift toward suits brought by city, state, and tribal governments. These government plaintiffs claim that the manufacturers engaged in false, misleading, or fraudulent advertising.
1
Rebecca L. Haffajee and Michelle M. Mello, Drug Companies’ Liability for the Opioid Epidemic, 377 New Eng J Med 2301, 2301 (2017).
2
Id.
3
Odds of Dying (National Safety Council), archived at http://perma.cc/4HU5-KXTM.
4
Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight against Prescription Drug
Abuse, 116 W Va L Rev 1117, 1122 (2013).
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They also claim that those advertising campaigns created a public
nuisance, forcing local governments to devote funds to unnecessary prescriptions for government-insured persons and to combat
the effects of abuse, addiction, and overdose. These suits, based
in state-law claims, are being heard in both state and federal
courts, depending on the diversity of the parties in each case and
whether plaintiffs have chosen to bring federal claims. The suits
in federal courts have been moved into a multidistrict litigation
(MDL) in the Northern District of Ohio.5
Although the MDL has drawn public and academic attention,6 this Comment focuses on the suits in state courts. In the
shadow of the MDL, a number of state and local governments
have fought to keep their cases out of federal court, emphasizing
their desire to maintain local adjudication of their claims. In contrast, the defendant manufacturers have repeatedly sought to
shift control to national decision-makers. Manufacturers’ tactics
have frequently included requesting stays of litigation under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Primary jurisdiction is a commonlaw doctrine allowing parties to move for a court to stay or dismiss
a case in one of two scenarios: (a) at least one issue raised by the
claim falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an administrative
agency, or (b) the litigation involves an issue over which the court
has jurisdiction but wishes to seek the agency’s expert advice.7 In
the opioid cases, defendant manufacturers have repeatedly argued that litigation should be delayed until the federal Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) has answered certain scientific questions underlying plaintiffs’ claims, such as the actual risk of addiction associated with long-term use of prescription opioid painkillers. State courts in California, New York, and Oklahoma have
addressed such requests for stays directly. While the California

5
Abbe R. Gluck, Ashley Hall, and Gregory Curfman, Civil Litigation and the Opioid
Epidemic: The Role of Courts in a National Health Crisis, 46 J L Med & Ethics 351, 359 (2018).
6
See, for example, Jan Hoffman, Can This Judge Solve the Opioid Crisis? (NY
Times, Mar 5, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/AQ55-SJZC; Andrew M. Parker, Daniel
Strunk, and David A. Fiellin, State Responses to the Opioid Crisis, 46 J L Med & Ethics
367, 375 (2018).
7
See Arsberry v Illinois, 244 F3d 558, 563–64 (7th Cir 2001) (discussing the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, but disputing the characterization of deference to agency expertise
as an exercise of primary jurisdiction). But see National Communications Association v
American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 46 F3d 220, 222–23 (2d Cir 1995) (supporting the
use of primary jurisdiction to describe state court deference to federal agency expertise).
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court issued a stay,8 judges in New York9 and Oklahoma10 declined to do so.
This Comment addresses the question whether stays of litigation under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are appropriate
in the context of state-law false advertising claims against prescription opioid manufacturers in state courts. Part I places the
current litigation in the context of state and federal regulation of
prescription drugs and describes lessons learned from litigation
over an analogous public health crisis: tobacco. Part II details the
disagreement among state courts as to whether stays should be
granted under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Part III delineates the doctrinal arguments for and against stays under the
primary jurisdiction doctrine in these cases, concluding that adherence to the doctrine’s guiding principles does not require
judges to grant such stays. Part IV reframes the requests for
stays in these cases as arguments over which institution—state
courts or the FDA—should get to determine evidentiary sufficiency on questions of fact in the face of scientific uncertainty.
This novel approach shows that requests for stays to await the
creation of new evidence constitute a unique category of primary
jurisdiction requests, which, if granted, can have the effect of raising plaintiffs’ burden of evidence.
The differences between the evidentiary standards that state
courts apply and those that the FDA apply can be analogized to
the story of the tortoise and the hare. While state courts are willing to move more quickly and may be more error prone, the high
standard of evidence that the FDA applies may render the agency
more accurate but slower to reach a decision. Forcing plaintiffs to
wait for FDA evaluation detracts from the tort system’s goals of
deterrence and compensation, goals which agencies like the FDA
are not designed to address. Ultimately, because state court tort
systems are uniquely focused on the specific harms caused to
plaintiffs, they are better able to motivate research addressing
those questions, raising the likelihood that an accurate assessment of liability will be reached in the long term.

8
9
10

People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2015 WL 5123273, *1 (Cal Super).
In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 4760685, *2 (NY Sup).
State v Purdue Pharma LP, 2017 WL 10152334, *1 (Okla Dist).
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I. BACKGROUND: DRUG REGULATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH
CRISES
Like all prescription drugs, opioid painkillers are subject to
both state and federal regulations. As the opioid addiction crisis
has exploded and gained public attention in recent years, government officials at the local, state, and federal levels have all engaged in efforts to combat it. This Part explores the recent history
of opioid regulation in the United States leading up to the current
litigation, including the lessons that might be drawn from litigation against the manufacturers involved in the tobacco national
health crisis. Both the opioid litigation and tobacco cases have involved allegations that companies concealed or misstated information about the health risk of their products, causing extensive
harms to localities across the country.
A.

Federal and State Regulation of Marketing for Prescription
Drugs

Although the FDA regulates marketing of prescription drugs
under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act11 (FDCA), the effectiveness of FDA regulation has been questioned on two fronts. First,
the FDA rarely sanctions manufacturers for violating FDCA marketing violations.12 Second, the FDA only regulates marketing
materials that name a branded product.13 Prescription drug manufacturers can therefore skirt FDA requirements by creating marketing materials describing a class of drugs—such as opioid pain
relievers—without mentioning any particular brand name.
The inefficacy of FDA regulation has motivated state governments to pursue litigation in an attempt to stem misleading advertisements of prescription drugs, including opioids. For example, in 2004, three states separately sued Janssen
Pharmaceuticals to curb certain advertising practices.14 The
states alleged that a letter Janssen sent physicians to promote

11

52 Stat 1040 (1938), codified as amended at 21 USC § 301 et seq.
Vicki W. Girard, Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful Promotion of
Approved Drugs: Why the False Claims Act is the Wrong Rx, 12 J Health Care L & Pol 119,
125 (2009) (noting that, rather than pursuing punitive sanctions, the FDA “typically attempts to achieve compliance from companies through less formal means,” such as warning letters).
13 21 USC § 352(n). See discussion in Part III.B.
14 See generally Ortho–McNeil–Janssen Pharm, Inc v State, 432 SW3d 563 (Ark
2014); State v Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharm, Inc, 777 SE2d 176 (SC 2015), cert denied 136
S Ct 824 (2016); State v Johnson & Johnson, 704 SE2d 677 (W Va 2010).
12
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the schizophrenia drug Risperdal violated state consumer protection laws by failing to accurately describe the risk of patients developing hyperglycemia and diabetes.15 Plaintiffs’ claims relied in
part on a “warning letter” the FDA had sent to Janssen raising
the same concerns.16 In two out of the three cases, the state courts
ultimately concluded that the FDA warning letter was not permissible evidence of wrongdoing because it was not the result of
a formal review of the evidence by the agency.17 The states’ attempts to put force behind a relatively weak FDA intervention
therefore failed.
Viewed in this context, the current litigation against prescription opioid manufacturers is only the latest salvo in a longrunning battle over the proper role of state and local governments
in regulating the marketing of FDA-approved prescription drugs.
The scale of the opioid addiction crisis heightens the stakes of the
current fight and has generated a large number of similar cases.
But the questions raised in these cases over the proper balance of
state and FDA control in questions of misleading marketing will
have ramifications for the regulation of marketing all prescription
drugs, not just prescription opioids.
B.

Current Litigation against Prescription Opioid
Manufacturers

Local government plaintiffs in California, New York, and
Oklahoma have levied similar claims against a heavily overlapping set of defendants including Purdue Pharma (“Purdue”), Actavis, and Teva Pharmaceuticals. Although the causes of action
differ according to the specific laws of each state, the general assertion is the same: defendant manufacturers engaged in false or
misleading advertising practices, and plaintiffs incurred damages
because those practices forced them to expend public funds to address the resulting public nuisance. This Part outlines the details
of these cases in order to demonstrate that they are sufficiently
similar to merit analysis as a group, despite being heard by different states’ courts.

15 The states were West Virginia, Arkansas, and South Carolina. For more discussion of these actions, see generally Cary Silverman and Jonathan L. Wilson, State Attorney
General Enforcement of Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices Laws: Emerging Concerns
and Solutions, 65 U Kan L Rev 209 (2016).
16 Id. See, for example, Johnson & Johnson, 704 SE2d at 683.
17 Silverman and Wilson, 65 U Kan L Rev at 227–30 (cited in note 15).
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Attorneys for the County of Santa Clara and Orange County
brought suit against Purdue and several other prescription opioid
manufacturers on behalf of the people of California in 2014.18 Specifically, the suit claims that defendant manufacturers violated
the California False Advertising Law,19 the California Unfair
Competition Law,20 and the California Public Nuisance Law.21
The counties alleged:
[Beginning in] the late 1990s . . . and continuing today, each
Defendant began a sophisticated marketing scheme premised on deception to persuade doctors and patients that opioids can and should be used to treat chronic pain. Each Defendant spent, and some continue to spend, millions of dollars
on promotional activities and materials that falsely deny or
trivialize the risks of opioids and overstate the benefits of
opioids.22
The California Advertising Law explicitly forbids any statement
in advertising “which is untrue or misleading, and which is
known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be
known, to be untrue or misleading.”23
In New York, county government plaintiffs allege seven distinct causes of action: deceptive acts and practices,24 false advertising,25 common-law public nuisance, false statements to obtain
public funds,26 fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligence.27 New
York state law defines “false advertising” as
advertising, including labeling, of a commodity . . . if such advertising is misleading in a material respect. In determining
whether any advertising is misleading, there shall be taken
into account (among other things) . . . the extent to which the
advertising fails to reveal facts material in the light of such
18

See generally People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2015 WL 5123273.
Cal Bus & Prof Code §§ 17500–09.
20 Cal Bus & Prof Code §§ 17200–10.
21 Cal Civ Code §§ 3479–80. See Fourth Amended Complaint for Violations of
California False Advertising Law, California Unfair Competition Law, and Public Nuisance, Seeking Restitution, Civil Penalties, Abatement, and Injunctive Relief, People v
Purdue Pharma LP, No 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC, *4 (Cal Super filed July 7, 2017)
(California Complaint).
22 California Complaint at *1 (emphasis in original) (cited in note 21).
23 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17500.
24 NY Gen Bus Law § 349.
25 NY Gen Bus Law § 350.
26 NY Soc Serv Law § 145-b.
27 In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 3115102, *3 (NY Sup).
19
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representations with respect to the commodity or employment to which the advertising relates under the conditions
prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as
are customary or usual.28
Cases brought by nine different counties were transferred to the
Commercial Litigation division of the New York Supreme Court
in Suffolk County for coordinated disposition.29
Oklahoma Attorney General Mike Hunter meanwhile also
brought suit. The complaint alleges that defendants30 are responsible for “massive and unprecedented marketing campaigns
through which they misrepresented the risks of addiction from
their opioids”31 and alleges public nuisance, fraud and deceit, unjust enrichment, violations of state Medicaid laws, and Oklahoma
Consumer Protection Act32 claims.33 The Oklahoma Consumer
Protection Act defines a “deceptive trade practice” as “a misrepresentation, omission or other practice that has deceived or could
reasonably be expected to deceive or mislead a person to the detriment of that person.”34
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, defendants in the
California, Oklahoma, and New York cases asked the state courts
to dismiss or stay the claims under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This common-law doctrine permits judges to delay litigation in order to allow a federal agency to address an underlying
issue, either because the issue is within the agency’s jurisdiction
or because the court could benefit from the agency’s advice.35 In
such cases, the court may refer the issue to the relevant agency.36
The decision to refer has the effect of delaying the case until the
28

NY Gen Bus Law § 350-a.
In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 3115102 at *2.
30 In March 2019, Purdue reached a settlement with the state of Oklahoma for $270
million. See generally Consent Judgment as to the Purdue Defendants, State v Purdue
Pharma LP, No CJ-2017-816 (Okla Dist filed Mar 26, 2019). In June 2019, the state of
Oklahoma also settled with Teva Pharmaceuticals for $85 million. See generally Consent
Judgment as to the Teva Defendants, State v Purdue Pharma LP, No CJ-2017-816 (Okla
Dist filed June 24, 2019). The case against the remaining defendants went to trial in July
2019, and as this piece was going to print no verdict had been announced. For a review of
the trial, see Jackie Fortier, Pain Meds as Public Nuisance? Oklahoma Tests a Legal Strategy for Opioid Addiction (NPR, July 16, 2019), archived at http://perma.cc/E45U-XW27.
31 Original Petition, State v Purdue Pharma LP, No CJ-2017-816, *1 (Okla Dist filed
June 30, 2017) (Oklahoma Petition).
32 15 Okla Stat Ann § 752(13).
33 See also Oklahoma Petition at *20–30 (cited in note 31).
34 15 Okla Stat Ann § 752(13).
35 See United States v Western Pacific Railroad Co, 352 US 59, 63–64 (1956).
36 Id. For further discussion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, see Part III.A.
29
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agency has completed its review, a timeline which can be indefinite. In the opioid cases, defendants are asking courts to delay
trial pending the completion of a new set of studies recently ordered by the FDA. As further discussed in Part III, a stay in these
cases would likely delay litigation substantially.
C.

Existing and Ongoing FDA Reviews of Risks and Benefits of
Prescription Opioids

At the heart of the state-law misleading advertising claims is
a dispute over the actual risks and benefits of prescribing opioids
for chronic, noncancer pain. In requesting that suits be dismissed
or stayed, prescription opioid manufacturers point to both the
FDA’s previous reviews of scientific evidence and a series of new
studies currently being conducted at the FDA’s request. As described below, those new studies were ordered in response to concerns about the addictive qualities of prescription opioids brought
to the FDA’s attention by a group of physicians.
In 2012, a group of doctors calling themselves Physicians for
Responsible Opioid Prescribing submitted a citizens’ petition to
the FDA (the “PROP petition”).37 The petition noted that “a fourfold increase in prescribing of opioid analgesics has been associated with a four-fold increase in opioid related overdose deaths.”38
The petition spurred the FDA to review evidence on three specific
questions.39 The first question is whether the FDA should remove
“moderate” noncancer pain from the approved uses listed on labeling for opioid pain relievers. The second is whether the FDA
should set a maximum approved daily dose of opioid pain relievers prescribed for noncancer pain. Finally, the third question is
whether the FDA should set a ninety-day limit on the duration of
prescriptions for noncancer pain.40
In 2013, after completing a review of existing scientific evidence, the FDA made a series of binding factual determinations
37 Petition from Physicians for Responsible Opioid Prescribing to Dockets Management Branch, Food and Drug Administration (July 25, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/ET36-FWUY (PROP Petition). Regulations governing the FDA’s conduct
under the FDCA include a provision for citizens to submit such petitions. 21 CFR § 10.20.
Upon receiving a petition, the FDA is obligated to respond. 21 CFR § 10.30.
38 PROP Petition at *2 (cited in note 37).
39 Food and Drug Administration, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Letter
from Dr. Janet Woodcock to Dr. Andrew Kolodny, President of Physicians for Responsible
Opioid Prescribing *1 (Sept 10, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/25ZF-SFBW (FDA Petition Response).
40 Id.
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regarding the use of a subset of opioid pain relievers known as
“extended-release/long-acting” (ER/LA).41 The FDA determined
that some labeling changes were appropriate, including removal
of the indication for “moderate” pain, but that existing evidence
was not sufficient to justify the implementation of maximum
daily doses or maximum durations for prescriptions.42 Regarding
the maximum daily dose question, the FDA stated that while
available research “appear[s] to credibly suggest a positive association between high-dose opioid use and the risk of overdose
and/or overdose mortality . . . the point at which the risk of overdoserelated death increases enough to change the benefit-risk assessment of the studied opioids cannot be determined from these studies.”43 Regarding the maximum duration question, the response
to the petition stated that “[t]he cited literature does not identify
a duration threshold beyond which the risk of addiction outweighs the benefits of opioid treatment.”44
Importantly, the FDA also announced that, for the first
time,45 it would require manufacturers of ER/LA prescription opioids to conduct new studies “to assess the known serious risks of
misuse, abuse, hyperalgesia,46 addiction, overdose and death” associated with long-term use.47 The timelines laid out for these
studies ranged from expected completion dates of August 2015 to
2018.48 The defendant manufacturers argue that completion of
these studies is crucial before determining their potential liability, and thus the state court litigation should be stayed.
D. Lessons from Tobacco Litigation
Many observers have pointed out the analogies between the
litigation against prescription opioid manufacturers and that

41 Id. ER/LA opioid pain relievers are distinguished from “immediate-release” opioid
pain relievers. Id at *4.
42 FDA Petition Response at *9, 11–17 (cited in note 39).
43 Id at *14.
44 Id at *16.
45 For a thorough review of FDA action regarding prescription opioids, see FDA,
Timeline of Selected FDA Activities and Significant Events Addressing Opioid Misuses and
Abuse (Aug 6, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/J3NU-34EJ.
46 Hyperalgesia is a condition where “the patient becomes more sensitive to certain
painful stimuli over time.” FDA Petition Response at *10 n 41 (cited in note 39).
47 Id at *11.
48 Id.
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against big tobacco companies.49 One aspect of the tobacco litigation worth highlighting here is the resolution in the 1990s of a
large number of suits in the form of a master settlement agreement (MSA). This MSA provides a cautionary note against centralized resolution of national crises that manifest in local harms
because such resolutions may not address the specific harms felt
in each locality.
The history of the MSA raises concerns about the ability of
such centralized agreements to effectively compensate harms at
the local level. In 1998, forty-six states, five US territories, and
the District of Columbia entered into settlement agreements with
the four largest tobacco companies.50 In exchange for releasing
those companies from liability for future claims, the states were
promised a total of $206 billion over the next twenty-five years,
followed by up to $9 billion per year in perpetuity.51 However, the
agreement did not provide guidance on how that money would be
spent. As of 2006, states were only spending about 5 percent of
that money on tobacco control, and about 32 percent on health
initiatives, with the remaining 60 percent or so going to a wide
range of initiatives unrelated to the harms of tobacco use.52 Because state governments were parties to the settlement, it is unclear how much, if any, of that money made it to city and county
governments, many of which are bringing suits against opioid
manufacturers today.53
The recent experience of the MSA may well be informing city
and county governments’ strategies in choosing to bring their own
suits in state court.54 Professors Abbe Gluck, Ashley Hall, and
Gregory Curfman argue that local government plaintiffs have
49 See, for example, Derek Carr, Corey S. Davis, and Lainie Rutkow, Reducing Harm
through Litigation against Opioid Manufacturers? Lessons from the Tobacco Wars, 133
Pub Health Reports 207, 207–08 (2018); Gluck, Hall, and Curfman, 46 J L Med & Ethics
at 351 (cited in note 5). At least one tobacco manufacturer also invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine in an attempt to have an unfavorable verdict vacated. The federal district
court declined to grant the stay, noting that the court, not the FDA, had the responsibility and expertise necessary to remedy violations of RICO, the statute under which the
Government had sued. United States v Philip Morris USA, Inc, 787 F Supp 2d 68, 77–80
(DDC 2011).
50 Carr, Davis, and Rutkow, 133 Pub Health Reports at 208 (cited in note 49).
51 Frank Sloan and Lindsey Chepke, Litigation, Settlement, and the Public Welfare:
Lessons from the Master Settlement Agreement, 17 Widener L Rev 159, 161, 198–99 (2011).
52 Id at 215.
53 See Gluck, Hall, and Curfman, 46 J L Med & Ethics at 355 (cited in note 5).
54 See id (noting that local governments “have been motivated to sue by a concern
that financial settlements to states may not necessarily result in money being transferred
directly to local communities”).
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been clear about wanting to maintain control of their litigation,
even when they have struggled to articulate the precise form of
relief they hope for.55 As if to emphasize this point, Oklahoma City
recently filed its own suit in state court, despite the state of
Oklahoma’s ongoing litigation.56
The desire to maintain local control has manifested in multiple ways. Not only are city and local governments filing suit, but
in many cases they are specifically choosing to do so in state court
and resisting attempts by defendants to have those cases removed
to federal court. For example, the motion for a stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the California suit was only brought
after that case had been removed to federal court and then remanded to state court.57 The suit brought by the state of Oklahoma
was only recently remanded to state court.58 The defendant manufacturers had removed the case in June 2018, six months after the
state court denied their request for stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
The existence of the MDL appears to be heightening plaintiffs’ desire to remain in state courts.59 For example, an attorney
for the state of Oklahoma stated at a press conference that “the
effort to return [the] lawsuit to state court was to keep it from
potentially being folded into more than 800 similar lawsuit[s]
pending in Ohio.”60 In announcing the new suit by Oklahoma City,
a city attorney similarly noted that the city “will resist any attempts by the 38 defendants to transfer the litigation to federal
court and combine it with [the MDL] in Ohio.”61 Such a desire may
be counterintuitive to those who see the MDL as an opportunity
to quickly and efficiently extract a large settlement from the major defendants. But the tobacco MSA may have taught some local
governments that the transaction costs saved in a centralized settlement do not make up for losing the ability to control the flow of

55

Id.
William Crum, Oklahoma City Files Its Own Opioid Lawsuit (The Oklahoman,
Nov 8, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/XN6W-LX6B.
57 People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2014 WL 6065907, *4 (CD Cal 2014) (order to remand
due to lack of diversity jurisdiction).
58 Ken Miller, Judge Sends Oklahoma’s Lawsuit against Opioid Makers Back to State
Court (Insurance Journal, Aug 7, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/PX9U-S6BN.
59 See Gluck, Hall, and Curfman, 46 J L Med & Ethics at 359 (cited in note 5).
60 Miller, Judge Sends Oklahoma’s Lawsuit against Opioid Makers Back to State
Court (cited in note 58).
61 Crum, Oklahoma City Files Its Own Opioid Lawsuit (cited in note 56).
56
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funds. At least one set of plaintiffs has gone so far as to withdraw
its case in order to escape the MDL.62
This desire to avoid a consolidated or centralized resolution
of this dispute casts a new light on the application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine in these cases. Stepping back from the details of the doctrine to look at its effects as a whole, it is clear that
invoking primary jurisdiction is a tool that manufacturer defendants can employ to centralize dispute resolution. Rather than let
dozens of state courts resolve various factual issues for themselves, defendants’ actions suggest they would prefer that such
factual conclusions be drawn by a single federal agency, and are
forcing plaintiffs to fight to continue proceedings under local
control.
II. THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DISAGREEMENT AMONG STATE
COURTS
Three state courts have issued decisions responding to defendant opioid manufacturers’ requests for stays under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Although the legal questions, facts,
and defendants are similar in all three cases, one court chose to
grant the stay of litigation while two declined to do so. This Part
summarizes defendants’ arguments for staying litigation and the
reasoning behind the three state courts’ decisions. The following
Parts will evaluate that reasoning in light of the scientific uncertainties surrounding the opioid litigation and explore the relevance of the FDA’s planned course of action to the cases before
state courts.
A.

Defendants’ Requests for Stays

Defendants’ motions for stays under the primary jurisdiction
doctrine emphasize the technical complexity of the scientific questions underlying plaintiffs’ claims. For example, the California
plaintiffs alleged that the prescription opioid manufacturers

62 A lawyer representing eleven municipal governments from Missouri told reporters
that his clients decided to withdraw their suit because “[i]t got removed to federal court
where we did not want to be. . . . At some point soon, we’re going to refile back in state
court.” Jordan Larimore, Attorney Withdraws Opioid Lawsuit, Plans to Refile (The Joplin
Globe, Nov 13, 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/3BQM-ELYE.
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made seven different categories of misleading or misrepresentational statements.63 In five of these seven counts, defendants have
argued in near-identical language that “additional data from the
ordered studies may assist in assessing this alleged risk.”64 By
contending that additional information would be useful to resolve
the dispute, the defendants laid the basis for their subsequent assertion that granting a stay would meet the two goals of the primary jurisdiction doctrine: “allowing [the court] to take advantage of FDA’s expertise” and “ensur[ing] uniform application
of the regulatory laws by avoiding a decision by this Court that
may end up being contradicted by FDA’s subsequent assessment
of the same issues based on the results of the ordered clinical
studies.”65
In Oklahoma, defendants’ motion for a stay of litigation also
emphasized the FDA’s orders for new studies. The motion argues
that plaintiff’s claims
will [ ] necessarily fail if the FDA-ordered post-market studies confirm that Defendants did not misrepresent the relative
risks and benefits of using opioids for long-term treatment of
chronic non-cancer pain. But even if FDA later determines
that the science does not support some of the challenged representations, the State would still need to establish that Defendants knew the representations were false when made.
Thus, it is inefficient and potentially problematic for the
Court to wade into this issue before the science is fully
developed.66

63 California Complaint at *1 (cited in note 21) (claiming that defendants (1) overstated the benefits of opioids in improving patient functioning and quality of life; (2) understated the risks of addiction from chronic use of prescription opioids; (3) misrepresented
doctors’ ability to mitigate the risk of addiction; (4) falsely implied that “pseudoaddiction,”
in which patients exhibit drug-seeking behaviors but are not actually addicted, is a scientifically recognized phenomenon; (5) misrepresented doctors’ ability to safely and easily
manage withdrawal; (6) misrepresented the increased risks of addiction associated with
increased doses; and (7) omitted or minimized other adverse effects of opioid use).
64 See (1) Notice of Demurrer and Demurrer by Defendants on Primary Jurisdiction
and Equitable Abstention Grounds; (2) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support, People v Purdue Pharma LP, No 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC, *14–17 (Cal Super
filed May 24, 2015).
65 Id at *13.
66 Defendants’ Joint Motion to Stay This Case under the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and the Court’s Inherent Authority to Stay Proceedings and Memorandum of Law in
Support, State v Purdue Pharma LP, No CJ-2017-816, *1–2 (Okla Dist filed Sept 22, 2017)
(Oklahoma Motion for Stay).
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As in the California suit, defendants focused on the underlying
scientific uncertainty and the possibility of conflict between the
state court’s findings and the FDA’s future findings.
The New York state court judge’s summary of defendants’ arguments for a stay of litigation similarly highlights scientific uncertainty and the risk of inconsistent application of the law across
jurisdictions.67 “[D]efendants contend . . . that it would be premature to adjudicate claims that the defendants misrepresented
those benefits and risks while FDA review remains ongoing.”68
Furthermore, the “FDA is uniquely qualified to resolve such matters relating to public health, and [ ] imposition of a stay pending
the outcome of its post-market studies will help ensure uniform
and consistent application of the law in all the jurisdictions where
similar litigation is taking place.”69 Here, the defendants cited the
fact that many cities, counties, and states across the country had
filed suit against these defendants as a reason to issue a stay in
favor of a centralized decision-maker. As described in Part I.D,
this argument runs directly contrary to the desires of plaintiffs
and the reason many of them have chosen to bring actions in state
court to begin with.
B.

State Courts’ Responses to Requests for Stays

State courts have split on granting the manufacturer’s requests for stays of litigation under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. While the California court granted a stay of litigation,70 the
courts in Oklahoma and New York declined to do so. As described
below, although the different courts did not all provide elaborate
analysis, the key disagreement appears to be over the extent to
which the courts would benefit from the FDA’s expertise in assessing the scientific questions at play in the opioid cases.
Notably, the California court did not explicitly state that it
was granting the stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Instead, the minute order states that the stay is granted “pursuant

67

In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 4760685 at *1.
Id.
69 Id.
70 The California court lifted the stay in a minute order issued on February 13, 2018,
allowing discovery to proceed. The court did not provide reasoning for its decision. Minute
Order, People v Purdue Pharma LP, No 30-2014-00725287-CU-BT-CXC, *1 (Cal Super
filed Feb 13, 2018).
68
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to the court’s inherent authority to manage its own cases.”71 However, the judge’s reasoning sounds in the primary jurisdiction doctrine. Citing Weinberger v Bentex Pharmaceuticals, Inc,72 the
judge agreed with defendants’ arguments regarding the need for
the FDA’s particular expertise in order to “protect the public’s
right to access this apparently important set of drugs, along with
appropriately making certain that medical personnel are properly
informed of the risks and benefits of the drugs and how to access
them.”73 The judge also distinguished the FDA’s technical expertise from the court’s capacity to rule on questions of misleading
advertising, noting that while
the FDA did not, and will not, rule on the propriety of the
marketing which defendants employ, that . . . is not the issue
on this motion. The issue on this motion is what determinations this court will need to make to rule on the propriety of
the marketing. All of those determinations fall within the
purview of the FDA.74
In contrast to the California court’s lengthier discussion, the
Oklahoma court took only one sentence to deny defendants’ request for a stay: “After review of the briefs and oral arguments
from the parties, the Court finds and orders that the State’s Petition sufficiently states its claims and those claims should not be
dismissed . . . pursuant to the Primary Jurisdiction doctrine or
the Court’s inherent power.”75 The court did not explain its reasoning, nor did it address its divergence from the California
court’s stay, which defendants described in their motion.76
The New York court also denied defendants’ motion for a stay
but, unlike the Oklahoma court, provided some reasoning. Specifically, the New York court disagreed with the California judge
about the necessity of the FDA studies to the success of the government plaintiff’s claims. Reaching the opposite conclusion from
that of the California court, the judge acknowledged that
the FDA is generally responsible for ensuring that drugs
marketed to the public are safe and effective . . . [and presumably has] expertise in evaluating pertinent scientific

71
72
73
74
75
76

People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2015 WL 5123273 at *1.
412 US 645 (1973).
People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2015 WL 5123273 at *2.
Id.
State v Purdue Pharma LP, 2017 WL 10152334 at *1.
Oklahoma Motion for Stay at *2 (cited in note 66).
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data. Here, however, the court will examine the state of scientific knowledge in the past and determine what data the
defendants possessed to support their marketing claims
when they were made—matters which the FDA will not address and which do not require its expertise but which, rather, routinely fall within the conventional experience of
judges.77
In other words, the New York court explicitly disagreed with the
Oklahoma defendants’ contention that plaintiffs’ claims would
necessarily live or die by the outcomes of the FDA’s new studies.78
Unlike the courts in California and Oklahoma, the New York
judge went on to note the third major consideration of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine: the harms of undue delay. Having dismissed
the idea that the new studies ordered by the FDA would even be
relevant, the order goes on to “express [the court’s] concern that
whatever value the studies might yield will be significantly outweighed, and justice defeated, by prejudice arising from the delays that inevitably accompany the agency process.”79 Notably,
unlike the California court, the New York court did not expressly
address concerns of uniform application of laws.
These three opinions reveal a divide among state courts as to
whether they should grant stays of litigation under the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to prescription opioid manufacturers. While
such different outcomes could have resulted from differences in
the particular facts, statutes, and state-court precedents at play
in each case, it is not at all evident that this is the case. The core
defendants—Purdue, Teva, Johnson & Johnson, and Endo—do
not vary across cases, nor do their briefs raise arguments particularized to each jurisdiction. As Part I.B describes, the statutes
underlying the claims are also substantively similar.80
Instead, the different rulings appear to result from the three
courts’ different understandings of how to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine to the cases before them. In particular, the
California and New York courts clearly disagree on the relevance

77

In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 4760685 at *2.
Oklahoma Motion for Stay at *1–2 (cited in note 66).
79 In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 4760685 at *2.
80 One possible argument is that the California statute’s explicit call to whether the
advertisements “should be known” to be misleading increases the relevance of newly created evidence to the suit in that state. See Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17500. However, the
judge did not reference this possibility in his minute order, nor did defendants raise it in
their motion. See People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2015 WL 5123273 at *1–2.
78
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of newly created scientific evidence, the need for the FDA to review that evidence, and the costliness of delay. Although the exact
cause of the disagreement is unclear, it may simply reflect different assessments of the comparative risks of continuing or staying
litigation. The New York court seems fairly confident that it is
capable of arriving at the right answer on the scientific question;
the California court, less so. But it is also possible that the decisions are driven by different implicit judgments of which party
should properly bear the risk of an incorrect or delayed decision.
The possible answers to this question will be addressed in
Part IV.
III. APPLYING THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE
This Part will walk through the application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine to misleading advertising cases against prescription opioid manufacturers. Doing so requires considering
whether a stay would support goals of uniformity and allow courts
to benefit from the FDA’s expertise, and weighing those benefits
against the costs of delay. While on the surface these principles
may appear to benefit from a stay in the opioid cases, strong arguments against granting stays emerge upon closer examination.
The uniformity principle reflects a desire for a uniform application of law, not a uniform assessment of facts to which law will be
applied. Uniformity can therefore be preserved without invoking
primary jurisdiction by carefully crafting a state-court remedy
that does not interfere with federal regulations. Similarly, the
value of agency expertise is limited by the issues to which that
expertise will be applied. Because the questions the FDA seeks to
address are different than those underlying the cases in state
courts, waiting for the new studies ordered by the FDA will not
significantly assist the courts in understanding the issues before
them. In the opioid cases, the marginal benefits to uniformity and
expertise are dramatically outweighed by the plausible costs of
delay, which may be measured in lives lost.
A.

Principles of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine

Primary jurisdiction is a common-law doctrine. Supreme
Court precedent instructs judges to consider two core factors in
determining whether to grant a stay under the primary jurisdiction doctrine: uniformity and expertise. As described in Far East
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Conference v United States,81 these two principles are distinct, yet
often related:
[I]n cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional
experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. . . . Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business
entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited
functions of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting
the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that
are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight
gained through experience, and by more flexible procedure.82
As the Court’s language suggests, the application of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine is not a matter of following a clear-cut formula. Judges must weigh the benefits of a stay against the risk
of “unreasonable delay.”83
Professor Diana Winters describes two “prongs” of the primary jurisdiction doctrine: “exclusive agency jurisdiction”84 and
“advice referral.”85 Exclusive agency jurisdiction was first developed in the context of rate-setting cases for common carriers and
public utilities, and separately in the context of labor relations.86
It permits litigation to pause while an agency addresses an underlying issue that explicitly invokes a regulatory scheme within
that agency’s jurisdiction.87 The rationale in such cases is that
permitting courts to rule on regulatory questions would violate
the legislative purpose of establishing a uniform, national regulatory scheme.88 But the doctrine has since expanded to include
81

342 US 570 (1952).
Id at 574–75.
83 See Ricci v Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 US 289, 320 (1973) (Marshall
dissenting).
84 Judge Richard Posner coined this term in Arsberry v Illinois, 244 F3d 558, 563
(7th Cir 2001).
85 Professor Winters coined this term herself. Diana R.H. Winters, Restoring the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 78 Ohio St L J 541, 547–50 (2017).
86 Id at 542.
87 This application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is distinct from arguments
regarding preemption. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is invoked when a plaintiff’s
claim is cognizable in court and not preempted by a federal statute, but an issue of fact or
law necessary to resolving the claim is within an agency’s jurisdiction. Defendants in these
opioid cases have also raised preemption arguments, but those claims have been dismissed. See, for example, State v Purdue Pharma LP, 2017 WL 10152334 at *1.
88 Winters, 78 Ohio St L J at 543 (cited in note 85).
82
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“advice referral” situations in which the court wants to wait for
an agency’s input even though no particular regulatory scheme
would be at risk.89
Defendants’ requests for stays in the opioid cases fall under
this second prong. As Judge Richard Posner once put it, granting
a stay or dismissing litigation under this flavor of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine “allows a court to refer an issue to an agency
that knows more about the issue, even if the agency hasn’t been
given exclusive jurisdiction to resolve it.”90 Unlike exclusive
agency jurisdiction cases, advice referral is discretionary, with
precedential cases providing only nonbinding guidance.91
The term “referral” is somewhat misleading, because in most
cases there is no formal mechanism by which courts can ask the
agency to answer a particular question.92 It could be the case, as
with the opioid suits, that the federal agency in question has already commenced review of an issue. In this scenario, the stay
merely allows time for such review to be completed. Alternatively,
the stay could be issued in order to give defendants time to approach the agency on their own. For example, a railroad defendant in a classic rate-setting case might easily be able to ask the
Interstate Commerce Commission to pass judgment on the reasonability of a rate.93 Notably, neither situation involves direct
communication between the court and the agency. Either the
court is passively waiting for the agency to complete a previously
planned action, or the defendants (but not the court) may be asking the agency to act.
The litigation over prescription opioids is far from the first
invocation of the primary jurisdiction doctrine in the context of
89

Id.
Arsberry, 244 F3d at 563.
91 Winters, 78 Ohio St L J at 549 (cited in note 85). For examples of precedential
cases providing discretionary guidance, see Mashpee Tribe v New Seabury Corp, 592 F2d
575, 580–81 (1st Cir 1979) (describing the three factors used by the First Circuit to determine when advice referral is appropriate: “(1) whether the agency determination lay at the
heart of the task assigned the agency by Congress; (2) whether agency expertise was required to unravel intricate, technical facts; and (3) whether, though perhaps not determinative, the agency determination would materially aid the court”); National Communications
Association v American Telephone and Telegraph Co, 46 F3d 220, 222 (2d Cir 1995) (describing the four factors used by the Second Circuit: (1) whether the issue is within the
agency’s expertise; (2) whether the issue is within the agency’s discretion; (3) whether
there is a significant risk of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a prior application has
been made to the agency).
92 Winters, 78 Ohio St L J at 551 n 73 (cited in note 85).
93 See, for example, Texas and Pacific Railway Co v Abilene Cotton Oil Co, 204 US
426, 439–41 (1907).
90
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prescription drugs regulated by the FDA.94 In Bentex
Pharmaceuticals, the FDA had withdrawn approval for a new
drug application after a review process concluded that no available evidence showed that the drug was effective.95 Manufacturers
of “me-too drugs,” similar compounds which would have been covered by the same application, sued for declaratory judgment that
their drugs were generally “safe and effective.”96 The Court upheld the district court’s decision to refer the questions of whether
a drug was a “new drug” for purposes of regulatory requirements
and whether it was “safe and effective” to the FDA, because the
two questions were, statutorily, tightly interrelated and required
the evaluation of complex scientific evidence.97 In doing so, the
Court noted that “[t]hreshold questions within the peculiar expertise of an administrative agency are appropriately routed to the
agency, while the court stays its hand.”98 Bentex Pharmaceuticals
illuminates the difficulty courts can face when disentangling the
uniformity and expertise principles, as scientific (or other) expertise is frequently the motivation for giving an agency authority to
set a uniform rule in the first place.
B.

Applying the Uniformity Principle

The first core principle of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is
that a court should stay litigation and refer the issue to the federal agency if it is necessary to ensure the uniform application of
federal law or regulation.99 The risk posed to the uniform application of federal regulation is closely tied to the remedies a court
might impose. For example, in Bentex Pharmaceuticals, the plaintiffs asked the Court to provide relief that was identical to the
regulatory authority of the agency, which would have effectively
superseded the agency’s ruling on a question of law.100 But the
government plaintiffs in the opioid cases are asking for remedies
deriving from state rather than federal laws, requiring courts to
94 For a thorough review, see generally Catherine T. Struve, Greater and Lesser Powers of Tort Reform: The Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and State-Law Claims Concerning
FDA-Approved Products, 93 Cornell L Rev 1039 (2008).
95 Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 US at 647–48.
96 Id.
97 Id at 652 (“[T]he ‘new drug’ definition under [21 USC § 321(p)] encompasses a drug
‘not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience to
evaluate the safety and effectiveness of drugs, as safe and effective for use.’”).
98 Id at 654.
99 Far East Conference, 342 US at 574–75.
100 See Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 US at 654.
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conduct a more careful analysis of whether those remedies pose
any threat to uniformity.
In the prescription opioid cases, plaintiffs have asked courts
for a combination of money damages and equitable relief. For example, the Oklahoma suit seeks penalties permitted by the state
laws allegedly violated; actual and punitive damages for fraud;
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains; and equitable relief in the form
of an injunction against further violations of the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act and abatement of the public nuisance.101
Similarly, the California suit seeks civil penalties and damages,
as well as an injunction against further violations of the Unfair
Competition Law and abatement of the public nuisance.102
Given these requests for relief, the next question is whether
“the FDA could provide . . . the relief sought.”103 In other words, if
the FDA has regulatory authority to do what plaintiffs have asked
the courts to do, the argument for staying the litigation in order
to preserve the uniform application of that regulatory authority
is stronger.104 In the opioid cases, the FDA has no authority to
grant civil penalties under state law or award damages, so the
core of this question is the extent to which the agency’s regulatory
powers overlap with state courts’ abilities to grant the requested
forms of equitable relief.
The FDCA authorizes the FDA to regulate both the labeling
of prescription drugs and certain forms of advertising.105 “Labeling” includes any and all written, printed, or graphic matters attached to the container of or accompanying a drug.106 The FDA
has broad authority to require manufacturers to include specific
information on any labeling for prescription drugs, including information regarding the risks and benefits of using the drug as
prescribed.107 But the agency’s authority to regulate nonlabeling

101
102
103
104
105
106
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Oklahoma Petition at *31 (cited in note 31).
California Complaint at *48–49 (cited in note 21).
Struve, 93 Cornell L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 94).
Id.
See Wyeth v Levine, 555 US 555, 566–68 (2009).
21 USC § 321(m).
See 21 USC § 352.
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advertising is more limited. The FDCA does not define “advertising,”108 but does provide a series of requirements for advertisements of prescription drugs.109 Specifically, advertising must include the “established name” of the drug (colloquially, its brand
name) as well as the drug’s formula and any information regarding
side effects and effectiveness that the FDA chooses to require.110
The FDCA therefore leaves a conspicuous gap in federal regulation of prescription drug advertisements: when a company distributes information about a category of drugs but does not include the brand name of any specific product, those materials are
not subject to the FDCA’s requirements. The prescription opioid
cases allege that in an effort to evade FDA regulation, the manufacturers did exactly that.111 Because unbranded advertising does
not meet one of the basic requirements of prescription drug advertising under the FDCA, the FDA has no authority to regulate
its content, and manufacturers can escape its scrutiny.
Based on this assessment of the FDA’s authority to regulate
prescription drug advertising and labeling, it appears that some
of the forms of equitable relief requested by plaintiffs in these
state court cases could, but do not necessarily, pose a threat to the
uniform application of FDA regulations. Plaintiffs’ requests for
injunctions against further violations of state consumer protection laws could implicate both branded and unbranded advertising, and possibly even labeling, presenting a possible conflict with
FDA requirements. If every state reaches its own conclusion
about exactly why and how the labeling of a particular opioid
painkiller was misleading, a manufacturer might in theory be
forced to produce fifty different labels for the same product. This
could hardly be considered a uniform regulatory scheme.
And yet, it does not necessarily follow that this possibility of
conflict requires state courts to halt proceedings pending FDA review. Instead, when it reached the point of granting relief, a court
108 See Joseph G. Milner, Sunlight and Other Disinfectants: Disclosure Obligations
under the Federal Securities and Drug Regulatory Regimes, 72 Food & Drug L J 141,
154 (2017).
109 21 USC § 352(n).
110 21 USC § 352(n).
111 Carr, Davis, and Rutkow, 133 Pub Health Reports at 209 (cited in note 49). One
particularly conspicuous example comes from comparing statements made in unbranded
advertising issued by defendant Endo Pharmaceuticals with statements made in branded
advertising for Endo’s flagship opioid, Opana ER. The former states, “People who take
opioids as prescribed usually do not become addicted.” The latter states that “use of opioid
analgesic products carries the risk of addiction even under appropriate medical use.”
California Complaint at *13 (cited in note 21).
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could simply elect to grant only those forms of relief that would
not threaten the uniformity of FDA regulation. These would include both monetary relief, in the form of damages and civil penalties, and certain forms of equitable relief. Specifically, the court
could issue injunctions against the unbranded advertising outside
of FDA purview.
The possibility of nonconflicting forms of relief distinguishes
the opioid cases from the situation in Bentex Pharmaceuticals.
That case asked a court to explicitly declare that plaintiffs’ drugs
were not “new drugs,” a term defined by the FDCA, particularly
for the purpose of determining whether the FDCA’s requirements
for new drugs applied to the drugs in question.112 By contrast,
state courts are not being asked to determine whether the labeling or advertising of prescription opioids is “misleading” for the
purpose of determining whether they violate the FDCA, but rather for the purpose of determining whether they violate state laws.
So long as state courts limit the remedies they grant to avoid
creating conflicts with federal regulatory requirements, the only
remaining argument for defendants is that there is something
problematic in a nonuniform determination of fact. That is, if a
state court found as fact that the risk of addiction from long-term
use of opioids was a percentage chance equal to X, but the FDA,
after reviewing new evidence, found that the risk of addiction was
equal to Y, and X did not equal Y, the defendant would argue that
this conflicting determination of fact would itself threaten uniformity. But the uniformity principle does not require different
fact-finding bodies to agree; it merely requires that the application of federal laws be the same across jurisdictions. Different
findings of fact by state courts have no bearing on the decisions
made by the FDA. If the FDA has determined that the underlying
facts do not require a product to be labeled a certain way, the FDA
simply won’t impose that requirement. While the possibility of
conflicting findings of fact raises interesting philosophical questions about the nature of truth, it is not in itself a point in favor
of granting a stay under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
C.

Applying the Expertise Principle

The second major principle of the primary jurisdiction doctrine is that courts may refer an issue to a federal agency when it
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Bentex Pharmaceuticals, 412 US at 652.
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is “within the peculiar expertise” of that agency.113 In the context
of claims regarding prescription drugs, the relevant “expertise” is
frequently understood to be the ability to assess complex scientific
evidence. For example, in Bentex Pharmaceuticals, the Court
noted that evaluating whether a drug was “safe and effective” under the FDCA “necessarily implicates complex chemical and pharmacological considerations.”114 Courts might be particularly inclined to refer issues to an expert agency in cases in which the
relevant scientific evidence is not only complex, but also highly
uncertain.115
The helpfulness of an agency’s apparent expertise in a particular area of science must be balanced against the reality that
courts make determinations of fact based on scientific evidence
every day. Such evaluations, the judge in the New York case
points out, “routinely fall within the conventional experience of
judges.”116 This reality suggests that scientific complexity is not a
sufficient condition to compel judges to refer questions of fact to
expert agencies. Rather, there needs to be some compelling reason why this particular question of fact merits a stay.117
One possible reason blends the principles of expertise and
uniformity. This line of argument reasons that the court could
determine this fact, but because the agency will also determine
this fact at some point, and in the event that the two determinations differ, the agency is more likely to be correct due to its expertise. Therefore, to avoid conflicting determinations of the same
fact which might lead to conflicting regulation, the court should
let the agency determine the fact first. There are echoes of such
an argument in the California judge’s reasoning that the court
should stay litigation because “the FDA . . . has taken action to
further explore” the relevant questions of fact.118
But in order for such arguments to be applicable, it must be
true that whatever future efforts the FDA might undertake could
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Id at 654.
Id.
115 See Winters, 78 Ohio St L J at 575 (cited in note 85) (describing courts’ willingness
to refer questions about the scientific evidence supporting the health benefits claimed by
certain foods to the FDA).
116 In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 4760685 at *2.
117 Of course, evaluating questions of scientific uncertainty involves a different kind
of complexity than the assessment of questions that are just technically complex. See
Part IV.
118 People v Purdue Pharma LP, 2015 WL 5123273 at *2.
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be reasonably expected to provide an answer to the specific question(s) of fact material to the case. In the opioid cases, there are
two major concerns with regard to materiality. The first is an issue of time, and the second is a question of precision.
First, is scientific evidence that did not exist at the time defendants were making the allegedly misleading statements material to determining whether those statements were, in fact, misleading? Defendants may be liable under states’ false advertising
laws if they knew or reasonably should have known that their
statements were false. As the judge in the New York case put it,
“the court will examine the state of scientific knowledge in the
past and determine what data the defendants possessed to support their marketing claims when they were made.”119 Under this
approach, new evidence to be examined by the FDA is totally immaterial to the case, because it could not have informed defendants’ knowledge at the time they were making statements.
One caveat to this understanding is that some states, including California, impose liability if defendants reasonably should
have known that a statement was false or misleading.120 Such liability kicks in only if the statement is determined to be actually
false or misleading. Plaintiffs could argue that the scientific uncertainty at the time defendants made their statements obligated
defendants to pursue additional research before making such
claims. In other words, defendants should have known what the
risks were because they should have undertaken the necessary
efforts to find out. This line of argument concludes that, because
defendants should have found out what the actual risks were,
they are liable for statements which later turn out to be false.
Here, new evidence—and the FDA’s review of that evidence—is
material to the outcome of the case, because actual falsehood of
the statements is relevant regardless of defendants’ knowledge of
falsehood.
Even if new evidence could be material, there is still the question of precision: that is, whether the evidence being produced by
the new studies and the questions to be addressed in the FDA’s
review of that evidence will answer the precise questions needed

119

In re Opioid Litigation, 2018 WL 4760685 at *2 (emphasis added).
Cal Bus & Prof Code § 17500 (forbidding any statement “which is known, or which
by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading”).
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in order to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claims.121 Such a precise fit between the FDA’s questions and the courts’ questions is threatened
by differences in both the scope of the inquiries and the nature of
the facts.
The new studies ordered by the FDA are designed to address
particular questions raised in the FDA’s response to the PROP
petition. These questions are limited to ER/LA prescription opioids. Most broadly, the new studies will “assess the known serious
risks of misuse, abuse, hyperalgesia, addiction, overdose, and
death,” and in particular “the effect of dose and duration of opioid
use on these serious risks.”122 On February 4, 2016, the FDA announced that it would require the manufacturers of each ER/LA
prescription opioid to conduct eleven specific studies, including
ten observational studies and one clinical trial.123 According to a
sample letter sent to each manufacturer, the objectives of the observational studies include estimating “the incidence of misuse,
abuse, addiction, overdose, and death associated with long-term
use of opioids”124 and “the incidence of abuse/addiction, overdose,
and death associated with long-term use of opioid analgesics for
chronic pain.”125 The clinical trial is required to “estimate the serious risk for the development of hyperalgesia following the longterm use of high-dose ER/LA opioid analgesics for at least one
year to treat chronic pain.”126 The trial must “[i]nclude an assessment of risk relative to efficacy.”127
By contrast, courts need to address the particular questions
of fact underlying the allegations raised by plaintiffs. To begin
with, these allegations are not limited to concerns about ER/LA
opioids. The drugs cited in the Oklahoma complaint include
“immediate-release” (IR) opioid pain relievers such as Actiq, a
brand of fentanyl manufactured by defendant Cephalon.128 The

121 As described in Part III.A, referral to an agency does not involve direct communication between the court and the agency. Either the court is waiting for the agency to
complete an action the agency already planned to take, or the court is providing defendants with the time to ask the agency for input.
122 FDA Petition Response at *10–11 (cited in note 39).
123 FDA, Timeline of Selected Activities (cited in note 45).
124 Judith A. Racoosin, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, Release from Postmarketing Requirement; New Postmarketing Requirement *1 (FDA, Feb 4, 2016), archived
at http://perma.cc/BU9F-VQC6 (PMR Letter).
125 Id at *4.
126 Id at *7.
127 Id.
128 Oklahoma Petition at *5 (cited in note 31); FDA, Prescribing Information for Actiq
(Dec 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/UN2T-P2NG.
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new studies being conducted will not shed light on the risks of
addiction and overdose from use of Actiq or any other IR opioid
pain reliever.
Further, the veracity of the particular statements alleged to
be false or misleading may not be tested by the FDA’s new studies. For example, Oklahoma alleges that training materials produced by Actavis for sales representatives claimed that “longacting opioids were less likely to produce addiction than shortacting opioids.”129 Similarly, the California complaint alleges that
detailers hired by defendants have “[d]escribe[d] their opioid
products as . . . less likely to be abused or result in addiction.”130
Such comparative claims will not necessarily be tested by the new
studies ordered by the FDA, because each manufacturer is required to conduct these studies on its own products. There is no
guarantee that each study will be designed in such a way that the
results could be compared.
In summary, it is not obvious that the new studies ordered by
the FDA will necessarily answer the material scientific questions
underlying the claims in these cases. They may shed light on
some aspects of some questions—for example, whether the incidence of addiction among long-term users of ER/LA opioid pain
relievers is higher than previously known—but they will not provide the court with all of the scientific facts needed to resolve
these claims. Given this reality, and in combination with the low
risk to uniformity discussed above, courts must consider whether
such a small possible gain of information is worth the costs of
delay.
D. Concerns of Undue Delay
In assessing the risks associated with a delay of litigation,
two major questions must be addressed: How long will the delay
last, and what is likely to happen during that time period that
otherwise would not if litigation continued without delay? In the
opioid cases, the length of the requested delay is tied to an ongoing process that the FDA has already undertaken: namely, the
completion of the new studies announced in 2013.131 The timeline
on those new studies has already shifted once. When the requirement for new studies was announced in 2013, the FDA set out a

129
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Id at *14.
California Complaint at *11 (cited in note 21).
See FDA, Timeline of Selected Activities (cited in note 45).
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timeline in which they would all be completed no later than
2018.132 But in 2016, the FDA changed the studies required for
each drug from the original set of five studies to a new set of
eleven.133 The timelines set for this new round of studies extend
through March 2020.134 That date represents the deadline for the
manufacturers to submit a report to the FDA. Although the
California court lifted the stay in 2018, had the court continued
to rely on the FDA timeline, that case would have been delayed
for a minimum of five years.135 As is, discovery in the case was
delayed for four years.
The implications of a four- or five-year delay are difficult to
assess precisely or generalize across cases, but some relevant
facts are clear. According to the Centers for Disease Control,
17,087 people in the United States died of an overdose involving
prescription opioids in 2016 alone.136 State-specific data are not
available for California, but New York saw 1,100 such deaths and
Oklahoma saw 322.137 Of course, the forward progress of litigation
may not have prevented any one of those deaths. But it is clear
that for every year of delay, new people become addicted to prescription opioids, and state and local governments continue to expend resources to treat and care for addicted residents. The precise extent to which these outcomes can be attributed to the
defendants in these cases is as yet unknown, but the allegations
against them are, at minimum, credible. In the event that courts
ultimately find defendants liable, any delay in the proceedings
will have meant delay in injunctive relief forbidding further misleading statements, as well as delay of monetary relief, which local governments could use to fund efforts to prevent and treat addiction and overdose.
IV. SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND EVIDENTIARY SUFFICIENCY:
WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
The preceding Part explained that the core principles of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine do not clearly require courts to
grant stays of litigation. Moreover, the application of the primary
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FDA Petition Response at *11 (cited in note 39).
PMR Letter at *3 (cited in note 124).
134 Id at *4.
135 See note 70 and accompanying text.
136 Puja Seth, et al, Overdose Deaths Involving Opioids, Cocaine, and Psychostimulants—United States, 2015–2016, 67 Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report 349, 352 (2018).
137 Id at 353.
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jurisdiction doctrine is highly discretionary. Any particular judge
might feel that a case would benefit from waiting for the completion of the studies ordered by the FDA. The following Part considers the consequences of such a decision by reframing the question
presented by these requests for stays as an issue of evidentiary
sufficiency. This reframing, in turn, leads to an exploration in
Part IV.B of the role of state courts in motivating the development
of scientific evidence in contexts of scientific uncertainty.
Part IV.C postulates that allowing state courts to proceed in the
face of scientific uncertainty is the most efficient means available
for motivating the development of new research needed to resolve
that uncertainty. Part IV.D argues that even if a judge feels that
a stay for the purpose of developing new evidence could be helpful
to plaintiffs in a situation of scientific uncertainty, defendants enjoy certain advantages which will likely cause them to benefit disproportionately from such a stay.
A.

Defendants’ Requests for Stays as Evidentiary Sufficiency
Arguments

Defendants’ requests for stays of litigation reflect two underlying assumptions. First, the requests are premised on an argument that the scientific evidence currently available is insufficient to accurately assess the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. For
example, the defendants in Oklahoma argued that “it is inefficient and potentially problematic for the Court to wade into this
issue before the science is fully developed.”138 As discussed in
Part I.C, that assertion reflects the FDA’s evaluation of the evidence available in 2013 to address the concerns of the PROP
petition.
Second, by linking the requested delay to the completion of
the new FDA studies, defendants seem to expect that those studies will produce sufficient evidence for the case to proceed. Thus,
these requests represent a variation of the “advice referral” prong
of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.139 Rather than simply ask the
court to rely on the FDA’s expert assessment of existing evidence
to answer a question of fact, defendants also ask the courts to rely
on FDA expertise to determine whether the scientific evidence
available is sufficient to allow any fact to be found. Furthermore,
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Oklahoma Motion for Stay at *2 (cited in note 66).
Winters, 78 Ohio St L J at 549 (cited in note 85).
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in the event that the court deems the available evidence insufficient, defendants implicitly ask the court to then rely on the
FDA’s assessment of what additional evidence would be sufficient. In other words, by asking the court to stay litigation pending the completion of a predetermined set of studies, the defendants are implying that those particular studies will provide
sufficient evidence for the court to rule on.
The key question, then, is how state courts should respond
when a stay is requested because the FDA (or another federal
agency) has determined an underlying question of fact to be scientifically uncertain—that is, when there is insufficient evidence
to answer the question. The court has three options. First, it can
deny the request for a stay and allow the trial to proceed, giving
plaintiffs the opportunity to present the available evidence, and
then decide whether the available evidence is sufficient to support
a verdict. Second, it can defer to the FDA’s finding of insufficiency
and choose to dismiss the litigation without prejudice, such that
plaintiffs can bring suit again if and when new evidence becomes
available. Third, it can defer to the FDA’s finding by staying the
litigation in order for new evidence to be produced, as the
California court did. This final option necessarily raises questions
of how and by whom new evidence is created, and to what extent
the court can control that process. Because the second option
merely represents a return to the pretrial status quo, the remainder of this Part will explore the consequences of the first and third
options: allowing trial to proceed in the face of scientific uncertainty or staying litigation while actively seeking the production
of new scientific evidence.
B.

The Tortoise and the Hare: Evidentiary Sufficiency
Standards in State Courts and the FDA

Because the FDA and state trial courts serve different purposes, they also apply different standards of evidentiary sufficiency in determining questions of fact. The goals of a state court
are to accurately compensate plaintiffs for harms suffered as a
result of defendants’ lawbreaking behavior, and to deter defendants from repeating the same violations.140 Plaintiffs must meet
different sufficiency burdens at different points in the trial, and
the particular standards applied also vary across states. For example, a California judge must grant a defendant’s motion for
140

See Guido Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84 Yale L J 656, 671 (1975).
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summary judgment before a trial “if all the papers submitted
show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact.”141
Ultimately, in order to reach a verdict, juries conduct a metaanalysis of available evidence in order to decide whether an alleged fact is more likely to be true than not. As the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals once described it, juries are “entitled
to combine the studies ‘to produce a whole that [is] greater than
the sum of its parts.’” 142 Juries may therefore draw connections
and make inferences across studies which, by any scientific standard, are not comparable, generating conclusions that an expert
would be unwilling to draw. The judge must only decide whether
a reasonable jury could find a legally sufficient evidentiary basis
to support the verdict.143 This willingness to draw conclusions,
perhaps prematurely, likely contributes to a perception that
state-court findings of fact as to scientific questions are less reliably accurate than conclusions drawn by the FDA.144
In contrast to the clear standards set out by courts, it is not
always obvious what standard the FDA applies when it makes
determinations of fact. The agency plays a regulatory role, meaning its goals are the regular operation of actors under its auspices
to the benefit of society.145 When the FDA brings an action against
a manufacturer for misleading labeling under the FDCA, it must
prove that its decision is supported by a preponderance of evidence.146 But when the FDA decides to take no action, it is not
necessarily required to state what standard the available evidence failed to meet. For example, in declining to set limits on
maximum dosage and length of treatment for ER/LA opioid painkillers, the FDA simply stated that “more data are needed . . . before the Agency can determine whether additional action needs to
be taken.”147 One possible explanation is that the FDA felt it
would not be able to meet a preponderance of evidence burden if
it took action against manufacturers. Another is that the FDA, as
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Cal Code Civ Pro § 437c(c).
Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its Benefits for Judicial Rulemaking under Scientific Uncertainty, 55 BC L Rev 331, 369 (2014), citing Oxendine v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc, 506 A2d 1100, 1110 (DC App 1986).
143 See Haw, 55 BC L Rev at 368 (cited in note 142).
144 See, for example, id at 362–65.
145 See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies
Defer Decisions, 103 Georgetown L J 157, 158–60 (2014).
146 See United States v 60 28-Capsule Bottles, More or Less, 325 F2d 513, 514 (3d
Cir 1963).
147 FDA Petition Response at *10 (cited in note 39).
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a regulatory agency, is also sensitive to the risks of overregulation
in a way that juries, presented with a plaintiff claiming serious
harms, may not be. The potential harm to consumers of making a
product less available is a particularly potent concern in the context of prescription drugs, which are designed to relieve suffering
even as they may end up causing other types of harm.148 And because the FDCA does not provide a private cause of action, nobody
can sue the FDA for failing to require a change to labeling or advertising.149 It is therefore unclear how the FDA would be held
accountable if it could have met the preponderance of evidence
burden in court, but nevertheless chose not to require the
change.150 In other words, the threshold of evidence at which the
FDA is willing to take regulatory action appears to be higher than
the threshold at which a jury would be allowed to find liability.151
The difference in the respective evidentiary standards applied by state courts and the FDA turns the primary jurisdiction
question into a story like that of the tortoise and the hare. Because they allow juries to draw inferences and conclusions from
scientific evidence which an expert would not, state courts come
across as the nimbler institutions, anxious to leap ahead despite
the risk of reaching premature conclusions which may later be
proven incorrect. The FDA provides a lumbering but more careful
counterpoint. Indeed, the whole theory of the primary jurisdiction
doctrine is that the agency is an expert body; its processes and
standards are based in scientific methods, not the assessments of
lay citizens. Because the FDA cannot be held accountable by private citizens for choosing not to draw any conclusion, and because
its powers include the ability to require manufacturers to conduct

148 See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U Pa L Rev 1003,
1023 (2003) (“[A] highly precautionary approach . . . might protect people against harms
from inadequately tested drugs; but it will also prevent people from receiving potential
benefits from those very drugs.”).
149 Heckler v Chaney, 470 US 821, 837–38 (1985) (“The FDA’s decision not to take . . .
enforcement actions . . . is [ ] not subject to judicial review under the [Administrative Procedure Act].”).
150 The sheer volume of possible enforcement actions available to an agency at any
given time mandate that the FDA will, at least sometimes, defer such actions or “decide
not to decide.” Professors Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that such deferrals
are broadly within the bounds of agency discretion, even when not strictly motivated by
resource constraints, unless Congress has mandated otherwise. Sunstein and Vermeule,
103 Georgetown L J at 161–62 (cited in note 145).
151 For a discussion of the ongoing debate about the carcinogenic risk of some antidepressants, and the risks involved in either restricting or promoting the use of those drugs,
see Sunstein, 151 U Pa L Rev at 1025 (cited in note 148).
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new research, its incentives to reach quick but uncertain conclusions are limited. The upshot is that the FDA will be slower to
act, but when it does, its assessments of the scientific questions
involved are likely to be more accurate.152 Whether to allow statecourt trials to move forward is therefore a decision about which
party should bear the costs of scientific uncertainty.
C.

Allowing State Court Trials in the Face of Scientific
Uncertainty

If the risk of an inaccurate finding of scientific fact by the
state court is in fact higher than the risk of an inaccurate FDA
determination years down the line, then the question becomes
whether the costs of such inaccuracies outweigh the benefits of a
rapid decision. Recognizing that the costs of inaccuracy can be extremely high, Professor Rebecca Haw argues that in the context
of toxic torts litigation, those costs are not only justified by the
tort system’s twin goals of deterrence and compensation,153 but
that the rules of evidence applied by courts make the tort system
uniquely positioned to both motivate and adapt to new scientific
evidence.154
First, overcompensating plaintiffs due to scientific uncertainty can motivate defendants to conduct new research.155 For
example, a jury in a 1980 case against the manufacturers of
Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug prescribed to pregnant women,
awarded $20,000 to a family whose child suffered birth defects
based on weak scientific evidence suggesting a possible association.156 The successful lawsuit motivated both more suits and a
series of studies designed to test the causal connection between
the drug and the birth defects. By the mid-1990s, these new studies had reached consensus: the drug did not in fact cause the birth
defects.157 That consensus came at a cost. By the time the new

152 Of course, the FDA is an executive branch agency subject to political change, so its
willingness to take regulatory action will vary over time. In some administrations, the
FDA has explicitly seen itself as “setting only a floor” on prescription drug regulation,
viewing state tort systems as providing useful additional oversight. Struve, 93 Cornell L
Rev at 1040 (cited in note 94). In other words, at least some administrations see the possibility of state courts reaching their own conclusions prior to an FDA decision as a feature,
not a bug.
153 Haw, 55 BC L Rev at 361–62 (cited in note 142).
154 Id at 365–68.
155 See id at 365.
156 Id at 363.
157 Haw, 55 BC L Rev at 363–64 (cited in note 142).
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studies were complete, Bendectin’s manufacturer had built up liability of more than $250 million in verdicts and settlements.158 A
similar story played out in mass litigation over silicone gel breast
implants.159 But in the end, it was the threat of massive liability
that motivated the research required to settle the underlying scientific uncertainty. A similar pattern could play out in the opioid
litigation. As the PROP petition reflects, doubts and questions
about the risks of prescription opioids have lingered for years
without clear answers. Massive liability for opioid manufacturers
may force them to do the studies that will answer the questions
raised in litigation, whether or not those answers ultimately support liability.
Second, the rules of evidence make the tort system responsive
to newly available scientific evidence. Trial court judges decide
first whether scientific evidence is admissible, and then whether
the totality of admissible evidence is sufficient to support a verdict.160 Although standards of admissibility vary among state
courts, most apply standards from either Frye v United States161
or Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,162 which superseded
the Frye standard in federal courts. The Frye standard requires
evidence to have “gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs,”163 while the Daubert standard tests
“whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid.”164 Haw argues that both standards permit
the admission of new scientific evidence because the core of both
tests is whether the studies are designed and conducted in such a
way as to comport with scientific standards, not whether their
findings are considered to be conclusive.165 As a result, the findings of new studies responding to the questions raised by these
cases should be admissible almost as soon as they are available.166

158 Id at 363. However, the verdicts were all later set aside or overturned on appeal.
Id at 363 n 241.
159 See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74
Tex L Rev 1, 18–25 (1995).
160 Haw, 55 BC L Rev at 365 (cited in note 142).
161 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).
162 509 US 579 (1993).
163 Frye, 293 F at 1014.
164 Daubert, 509 US at 592–93.
165 Haw, 55 BC L Rev at 366–68 (cited in note 142).
166 It is also in courts’ interest to be receptive to new scientific research, in so far as
courts’ legitimacy depends on the public belief that they are accurately drawing conclusions from fact. See Mike Redmayne, Expert Evidence and Scientific Disagreement, 30 UC
Davis L Rev 1027, 1036 (1997) (“[C]ourts will usually be receptive to scientific evidence
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In the opioid cases, that means that if manufacturers did complete a new study proving that plaintiffs’ claims were unfounded,
they would be able to rapidly have that evidence admitted and
use it to avoid liability.
On the whole, the tort system’s twin goals of deterrence and
compensation167 are better served if defendants bear the costs of
scientific uncertainty. Allowing juries to decide that the available
evidence makes plaintiffs’ claims more likely than not, even when
a scientific expert would say that available data are insufficient
to confidently draw any conclusion, places those costs on defendants who, like the Bendectin defendants, both face high liabilities
for jury verdicts and must fund new studies in order to prevent
future unfavorable verdicts.168 If new studies retrospectively show
the verdicts to be incorrect, this seems harsh. But if the trial is
not allowed to go forward, plaintiffs are left uncompensated for
credibly alleged harms, and defendants are not incentivized to
conduct new research. Plaintiffs would therefore bear the cost of
the harms suffered and, potentially, of trying to fund research to
generate the necessary evidence.169
Asking plaintiffs to bear the cost of research would create two
fairness problems. First, conducting research would require
plaintiffs to obtain large quantities of the drug in question. Put
plainly, plaintiffs would have to purchase the drug from manufacturers, adding the insult of profits for defendants to the injury
of a large expense for plaintiffs. Second, although plaintiffs in a
suit bear the burden of proving their claims, that burden is met
when they achieve the standard of evidence required of them by

. . . when it comes from traditional ‘hard’ scientific disciplines. This is because such evidence can be used to bolster the legitimacy of a court’s verdict and enables it to impose
effective closure on a dispute.”).
167 See note 153 and accompanying text.
168 One theory is that juries choose to award verdicts to plaintiffs in cases of scientific
uncertainty in part because they feel that defendants should have already conducted such
research. See, for example, David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 Cal L Rev
457, 486 (1999):
[W]hen a jury is faced with a plausible claim that a defendant’s product injured
a plaintiff, and is convinced that the defendant did not adequately research the
health effects of that product, it will frequently find for the plaintiff and be upheld on appeal unless the defendant can present solid scientific evidence refuting
the plaintiff’s claims.
169 Of course, in the context of the opioid cases, defendant manufacturers have been
asked to conduct research. The distinction is that that requirement was imposed by the
FDA, not motivated by a suit, and so the studies required are not specifically responsive
to the questions raised by the suit. For further discussion, see Part III.B.
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the state-court’s rules of procedure. Requiring plaintiffs to meet a
higher standard—that is, to satisfy the standards applied by the
FDA, another agency, or the scientific community at large—raises
that burden, weakening the ability of the tort system to pursue
its goals of compensation and deterrence. In this regard, questions of scientific uncertainty should not be treated as “special.”
They are simply questions of fact, and should be subject to the
same treatment as any other question of fact that arises in the
context of a torts case.
Thus, instead of deferring to the FDA on the threshold question of evidentiary sufficiency, judges ruling on requests for stays
under the primary jurisdiction doctrine for the purpose of waiting
for new evidence to be produced should deny such stays when
plaintiffs have met the standard of evidentiary sufficiency which
would otherwise apply at that stage of the case. The principles
that would guide judges’ discretionary decisions regarding requests for stays for the purpose of waiting for an expert to evaluate evidence do not sufficiently guide decisions regarding requests for stays under primary jurisdiction for the purpose of
waiting for new evidence. In this particular category of primary
jurisdiction requests, judges need to consider the evidentiary burden before getting to questions of expertise and uniformity. For
example, in the California case, in which a motion for a stay was
entered after the pleadings but before a hearing, the judge should
have considered whether the evidence in plaintiffs’ pleadings was
sufficient to indicate a triable question of material fact. If defendants had instead moved for a stay after a jury reached a verdict,
the court should have then considered whether plaintiffs could
survive a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. To
grant a stay when a plaintiff has met those sufficiency standards
would be to replace a sufficiency standard designed to serve the
goals of the tort system with a standard designed to serve the
goals of a regulatory agency.
D. Rebutting the Arguments for Awaiting New Evidence
There are reasons a judge might see a temporary stay under
primary jurisdiction as an appealing middle ground between going forward with a trial and terminating the case, but they prove
unavailing. For example, if after reviewing the allegations in the
complaint a judge believes plaintiffs have done enough to survive
a motion to dismiss but are unlikely to survive summary judgment, then the judge might reasonably be tempted to grant the
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stay in order to enable the new evidence to be produced. Granting
stays only within this narrow window of evidentiary sufficiency
may not appear to be unduly favorable to either plaintiffs or defendants. Defendants gain the possibility of being exonerated by
new evidence; plaintiffs suffer from the delay, but gain the possibility of having their case boosted by new evidence when they
were otherwise likely to lose at summary judgment. However, a
careful consideration of the mechanisms available for developing
new evidence reveals that the defendant manufacturers are systematically more likely to be able to take advantage of such a stay
than are state and local government plaintiffs.
The first available mechanism is to simply wait for, and rely
on, the new FDA studies. This is far from an ideal solution for
either party, but it imposes a particular disadvantage on plaintiffs. First, as described in Part III.B, the studies required by the
FDA are not directly responsive to the questions underlying the
suits in state courts. To the extent that the tort system is designed
to deter particular harms to specific plaintiffs, its ability to motivate research into the causes of those particular harms may be
unique. Second, the studies required by the FDA will be conducted by the defendant manufacturers themselves as a result of
the mechanism empowering the FDA to request studies. Because
the FDCA grants the FDA authority to approve labeling, the burden is on the manufacturers to prove to the FDA that their labeling is accurate by providing requested information.170 But making
litigation reliant on evidence produced under the exclusive control of one party (here, defendants) is contrary to the ideals of the
adversarial system.171 Not only would this raise concerns about
accuracy, but it may also allow defendants to manipulate the
timeline in which those studies are completed in order to extend
the delay. Although flagrant delays might cause the court to take
disciplinary action, a judge might have difficulty distinguishing
between legitimate delays due to the logistical complexity of undertaking large scientific studies and intentional delay tactics. In
an ideal world, plaintiffs, who bear the burden of proving facts at
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21 USC § 352.
Of course, plaintiffs can always present experts who will interpret and challenge
any evidence introduced by defendants. The difference here is that defendants have a monopoly on the generation of scientific evidence. Compare, for example, a suit against a
defendant company for polluting a public water source. Both sides would have access to
the water to measure the presence of the pollutant and study its effects. In the prescription
opioid cases, only defendant manufacturers can conduct the analogous research.
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trial, should have the opportunity to run their own studies or
identify studies by a neutral third party.
A court frustrated by the limitations of the FDA studies may
use its discretion to implement a second mechanism: creating a
“race to sufficiency” by tying the length of the stay to the identification of new, admissible, and sufficient evidence from any source
by either party.172 Such a solution would allow courts to seek new
research on the specific questions raised by the case at hand without the imposition of potentially wasteful costs on defendants. A
judge who truly wanted to utilize the FDA’s expertise in interpreting the new evidence could require litigants to petition the FDA
to review the outside studies via the same mechanism used by the
PROP petition.173
In theory, such a rule could motivate both parties to seek out
new evidence without the costliness of inaccurate verdicts. But in
practice, plaintiffs still face dramatically higher hurdles to winning such a race than defendants. As discussed in Part IV.C, defendant manufacturers by definition hold a monopoly on the production of the prescription drugs in question. In order for
plaintiffs or neutral third parties to conduct studies, they must
first obtain large quantities of the drug from the manufacturer.
Indeed, there is some reason to expect that if it were economically
feasible for state and local government plaintiffs to conduct such
research, they would have already done so. Many state universities are premier research institutions that have the facilities necessary to conduct the appropriate research.174 But manufacturers
are under no obligation to sell the necessary quantities of the drug
to such institutions, let alone to do so at an affordable price. One
could imagine procedural mechanisms that would allow a court to
compel manufacturers to provide the drug at little or no cost, but

172 Indeed, in the context of a national health crisis, it is quite possible that an independent organization such as a university has already commenced studies that are just as
well suited—or, hopefully, better suited—to addressing the particular factual questions
relevant to the case. Of course, such a rule would introduce the risk that litigants hustle
along seemingly comparable but shoddy research in order to have a favorable study be the
first to completion. But any new study would be subject to the court’s usual admissibility
standards, and the judge would have to be satisfied that the identified sufficiency gap had
truly been filled in order to lift the stay.
173 FDA Petition Response at *1 (cited in note 39).
174 Indeed, Purdue’s settlement with Oklahoma includes a commitment to provide
$102.5 million “to establish a new foundation for addiction treatment and research at
Oklahoma State University.” Bernstein and Zezima, Purdue Pharma, State of Oklahoma
Reach Settlement (cited in note 30).
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such a mechanism would seem to put the court in the uncomfortable position of managing a scientific study, a task that courts are
not competent to take on. Thus, even this alternative mechanism
for seeking new evidence turns out to unduly benefit defendant
manufacturers. The structural constraints on plaintiffs’ ability to
meet the higher evidentiary burden implicit in the granting of a
stay cannot be overcome by a more flexible consideration of other
sources of evidence.
In summary, state court judges tempted to grant stays in the
context of scientific uncertainty can do little to mitigate the burden that such stays impose on plaintiffs relative to defendants.
Allowing state court trials to proceed when basic sufficiency
standards are met therefore remains the best—albeit very
costly—mechanism for motivating new research to fill evidentiary gaps in scientific questions underlying cases. So long as
plaintiffs can meet the sufficiency burdens imposed by the court’s
rules of procedure, delaying trial in deference to a federal agency’s
finding of uncertainty is detrimental to the goals of the tort system and removes a key motivating factor for the pursuit of new
research.
CONCLUSION
In state court cases involving allegations of false or misleading advertising by manufacturers of prescription opioid painkillers, a straightforward application of the principles of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine does not necessarily direct judges to grant
stays of litigation. Allowing the litigation to proceed does not inherently threaten the principles of uniformity or expertise espoused by the primary jurisdiction doctrine. If and when a verdict
is reached in favor of plaintiffs, state courts can respect the uniformity principle simply by granting remedies that avoid conflicting with FDA regulations for the marketing of prescription drugs.
Instead, courts should recognize that these motions for stays
are premised on arguments about evidentiary sufficiency and
base their decision on whether plaintiffs are able to meet the sufficiency burden they would otherwise bear given the stage of the
case. By applying a lower standard of evidentiary sufficiency than
the one the FDA utilizes, state courts can play a unique and essential role in resolving questions of scientific uncertainty at play
in mass torts cases like the suits brought against opioid manufacturers. Jury verdicts in favor of plaintiffs may motivate defendant
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manufacturers to conduct the studies needed to determine the underlying facts more conclusively, while ensuring plaintiffs’ harms
are compensated. And in cases when plaintiffs have repeatedly
fought to maintain local control over litigation—particularly because they fear that a centralized remedy would, for them, be no
remedy at all—there is a heightened concern that allowing a slowmoving and relatively unaccountable federal agency to so heavily
influence the pace and outcome of litigation would systematically
benefit defendants at plaintiffs’ expense.
This approach is potentially applicable in a broad variety of
cases involving scientific uncertainty. The same types of arguments could arise when a catastrophe of national scale manifests
in local harms, and particularly when the causal links in that catastrophe are a matter of scientific controversy. The result is a
multitude of plaintiffs filing nearly identical suits against a core
cadre of defendants. The opioid and tobacco litigations fit this pattern, but so too could litigation over such diverse issues as climate
change, gun control, and the 2008 financial crisis. In all of these
cases, the arguments laid out above suggest that the interests of
all parties in reaching a rapid and accurate final conclusion would
be best served by allowing litigation in state courts to proceed. In
the opioid cases, the time delays of waiting could cost thousands
of lives.

